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ABSTRACT
Creating, building, managing a cost effective digital forensics lab including a team of qualified
examiners can be a challenge for colleges [1] with multiple campuses in multiple towns, counties and
states. Leaving such examination responsibilities to each of the campuses results in not only disparity
in the results but more than likely excessive duplication of efforts as well as the potential for
compromise of evidence. Centralizing the forensic efforts results in a team that is not subject to the
political pressures of a campus and virtually eliminates the possibility of examiner favoritism. Learn
what it takes to create a cost effective centralized digital forensics lab. It sounds simple but is truly
quite complex when you consider the chain-of-custody issue as well as the management support
needed during initial implementation. There will be resistance at some of the campuses while others
will welcome the removal of a burden. We will also examine why such a lab is necessary and what
can be learned about compliance to existing policy as well as the possibility of identifying the need for
additional policy/standards.
Keywords: digital forensics investigation malware criminal chain-of-custody centralized lab
1. THE CHALLENGE
Implementing centralized digital forensics investigation within a widespread enterprise can be
difficult. There are numerous fiefdoms involved, many of which hold self-serving interests which are
contrary to such a project. No matter how much sense it may make it is not uncommon to meet
massive resistance. The initial acceptance of the concept will often be the greatest challenge its
advocate will ever face!
Knowing your organization including the individuals involved in blocking or supporting such a project
is usually necessary in the collegiate environment. After all, commonly each campus is quite
independent from central management whose role is primarily that of obtaining funding and setting
budgets with some over site relative to more sensitive issues which certainly vary from college to
college and private versus the public sector. Some intelligence gathering is often essential to achieve
success.
Do not jump in whole hog without knowing the terrain. Plan….plan….plan….

197

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2011
2. JUSTIFYING THE PROJECT
Your greatest challenge is the justification. The balance of effort will be a piece of cake in comparison
but quite tedious at times. Care must be taken to ensure clarity and understandability. Often the
justification will be read by those who are unfamiliar with information technology and especially the
whole concept of digital forensics. To many digital forensics is just another term and very possibly is
simply an adaptation of the term forensics which has become so popular today in the field of law
enforcement. Many cannot relate that forensics in science and information technology is an analysis
technique which ensures that should illegal activity, whatever that might be, be found that the
evidence is preserved in a manner consistent with that which is acceptable to law enforcement and the
courts.
More than likely very few if any digital forensic investigations regarding malware infestations will
uncover criminal activity. However, it is entirely possible and you must be prepared. How
embarrassing would it be to the college if a staff or faculty member was detected with sums of child
pornography on the system including trading/sale of same but could not be prosecuted due to
inadmissible evidence? Take it a step further and envision that identifying that staff member to law
enforcement results in a determination that the staff member is also a child molester yet could not be
prosecuted due to the principle of “fruit of the poisonous tree” [2]. Surely, this something everyone at
every level wishes to avoid.
Preservation of evidence is not the only justification. The remainder relates to traditional management
concepts/needs.
2.1 Control
In order to ensure that the evidence (the malware infected device; specifically, the hard drive in the
case of an infected computer) is preserved in a manner satisfactory to law enforcement, etcetera it is
imperative that effective control is maintained throughout the process commonly referred to as the
“chain of custody” [3].
This requires the creation of detailed records of the handling and storage of a physical drive from the
time it is taken into possession by the information technology staff through and until the drive is
successfully and properly forensically imaged. In an ideal world the physical drive would be
preserved until it is established that there is not a criminal concern. However, in reality this is not
practical in most environments. The number of duplicate drives at each site likely would be excessive.
While efficient, this centralized process does tie up each drive for several days even with the creation
of a forensic image archive. There is the transportation in both directions as well as the time in the
forensic lab. Unless generously configured there will be times when a drive sits for two to three days
at the forensic lab until it has been successfully archived. As a result the average amount of time a
drive to be investigated is out of service is likely five business days. Also, the drive will remain
unusable for another day or so until it is wiped and reimaged. Thus, it is impractical to leave the
impacted user without a computer. Therefore each campus will need to keep a sum of drives on hand
and ready to go when infections occur.
In addition there is the issue of control while in the forensics lab. As will be seen later, there are
additional control benefits in the decentralized lab.
2.2 Savings
The question to be answered is whether the work which needs to be done is being accomplished and, if
so is it complying with all of the issues relative to evidence preservation? If no, an analysis is
required to determine why and identify the savings that can be realized through centralization. If yes,
then the issue is a comparison of costs between the current processes versus that of centralization.
More than likely if you are considering a centralized digital forensics lab either the current process is

198

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2011
not effective or does not exist but there should be a perceived need. Need takes many forms, constant
reinfection being one of them along with compromise of PII [4] or PCI DSS [5] information as well as
other information under development which should not be disclosed until ready; in other words
competitive information which also exists in the collegiate world, especially within the private sector.
2.2.1 Constant Reinfection
The primary cause of constant reinfection is the failure of a specific campus that does not follow
proper procedures when an infection occurs. With a centralized digital forensic lab such failures
become readily apparent and corrective actions can be initiated.
2.2.2 PII Compromise
When PII is compromised the rules/regulations/laws vary from jurisdiction in addition to the ethical
obligations. Hopefully your college already has a published policy regarding compromised PII. When
compromised PII is detected by a centralized digital forensic lab you are assured that the resulting
actions meet current requirements. The embarrassment that might occur should non-compliance be
discovered and reported by the media could result in incalculable damage.
2.2.3 PCI DSS Compromise
Failure to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard [5] likely will result in
unfavorable media coverage as well as the real potential for the loss of rights to process payment cards
on campus in a convenient manner.
2.2.4 Compromise of Competitive Information
Development of new majors/minors and other strategies including the development of new for fee
services are commonly business confidential until they are made public.
2.3 Staffing
The initial staffing size is difficult to calculate but certainly should be far less than when such
examinations are conducted at each campus. Staffing size is also dependent upon the working model.
Experience indicates that the decentralized lab requires a smaller staff in addition to offering other
advantages and efficiencies. In a typical environment, when a thorough examination is conducted of
each case to include production of a written report that can be read and understood at the campus by
non-information technology professionals, the average time per case is two hours.
2.4 Influence, Bias, etcetera
In a centralized model the examiners are sheltered from all forms of overt influence and bias as well as
friendships. It is quite common in a collegiate environment to “protect their own”, especially when
the unknown or misunderstood is encountered. All too often senior staff and faculty become
concerned that the case may impact their career, especially when they are unaware of peers
encountering similar problems. Dealing with the matter centrally and properly managing the entire
process can and should eliminate this concern.

3. CREATING, BUILDING AND MANAGING A COST EFFECTIVE DIGITAL FORENSICS
LAB
This is not a seat-of-the-pants project. Careful planning will result in successful implementation with
little or no disruption to existing operations. Key to this process is choosing the appropriate model and
while there are perceived advantages to both, the decentralized model offers greater flexibility and
opportunity.
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3.1 Models
3.1.1 Traditional Lab
The traditional lab is totally centralized and frequently is completely isolated from all other
information technology activities. This represents a great deal of cost which can be minimized in the
decentralized model. Typically, in the traditional lab the forensic examiners are solely responsible for
all activities from creating the archives to mounting the drives to be examined on their dedicated
forensic examination work station. Commonly, the examiner works from the console of the work
station.
There are variations, many of which will be described in the decentralized lab. However, most of the
initial costs of the traditional lab cannot be avoided.
3.1.2 Decentralized Lab
The concept of a decentralized lab is foreign to many yet much of its structure is similar to the
traditional lab and many of its features can be implemented in the traditional lab.
Basic Concept: Compartmentalize the many responsibilities of the digital forensics lab thus ensuring
a higher level of confidence and trust in its integrity while allowing some of the activities to be
performed “remotely”.
Forensic computers: Locate in a truly secure data center, preferably not located on the campus of
any of the colleges. Day to day support of the forensic computers is performed by operations staff to
the extent necessary to mount and dismount cases being examined.
Examination/Archive copies: Examination and archive copy functions are commonly created by the
same operations staff which supports the forensic computers. Thus, once a drive to be examined
arrives on site only operations staff trusted to support forensics ever handles the original physical drive
as well as all copies.
Forensic Examiners: Examiners access their assigned forensic computer remotely even when they
are physically based on site. Thus, examiners can be located anywhere they are able to connect
securely into the forensic network. Thus, should there be qualified forensic examiners on one or more
of the campuses they can be reassigned to the new forensic team. In addition, in today’s world of
digital mobility a valued team member can be retained should it be necessary for that team member to
not live in the region.
Forensic Network: The forensic network must be carefully architected to be isolated from the
balance of the college network and access to that rigidly managed and monitored as well as restricted
to forensic staff only! Logical maintenance of the forensic computers is the responsibility of the
assigned examiner. Physical maintenance is the responsibility of forensic trusted operations staff.
3.2 Building the Lab
The cost of building such a lab can often be minimized if the college’s network architecture already
has a centralized data center providing common services to all of the campuses. For those without this
option must consider whether to co-locate on an existing campus or completely off-site. Costs can be
minimized with co-location providing that the forensic staff work environment is isolated from the
general campus environment. Failure to do so compromises many of the benefits of a centralized
digital forensics lab.
3.2.1 Hardware
Hardware must be robust but not necessarily state-of-the-art. Forensic tools have not been that quick
to jump to the latest hardware architecture and likely will not abandon support for earlier platforms
which support XP. There may be some concerns regarding XP relative to Internet access yet since
such actual access should only be performed in a virtual mode that is not likely to be a near term issue.
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Clearly, XP platforms being replaced with Win7 etcetera can be utilized in the lab. Components of the
platform will require replacement for best performance as well as maximizing memory and external
ports. Also, some hardware write blocks, at least one per forensic computer will be needed. As hard
drives keep growing in size it may be appropriate to examine the case drive directly and based on the
result determine whether an archive image copy is needed.
3.2.2 Software
There are numerous software tools available. While there are other examination tools, serious
consideration should be given to choosing Encase [6]. It does require some training/experience to be
effective with Encase, but in the end it is the tool which is trusted in law enforcement circles should
they become involved. Beyond Encase, a trusted VM tool is needed as well as several other tools
which should be considered:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Automated registry decoder; e.g., Registry Ripper [7]
View the Registry in native mode; e.g., Registry Viewer [8]
Tool to locate and identify PII/PCI DSS data; e.g., Identity Finder [9]
Tool to evaluate links; e.g., Link Examiner [10]
Linux-like environment for Windows making it possible to port software running on
POSIX systems (such as Linux, BSD, and Unix systems) to Windows; e.g., Cygwin [11]
Possibly a network meeting tool; e.g., TeamViewer [12]
VM tool; there are many to choose from.
Sandbox Tool; e.g., Sandboxie [13]
Key Recovery; e.g., Recover Keys [14]

3.2.3 Staffing
All members of the forensic team must be chosen for their skills, experience and trustworthiness.
Fortunately it is very likely that you will be able to identify within your current professional staff. If
not, perhaps within faculty. In today’s job market it is possible you can locate key staff locally at
reasonable cost. Choose your staff carefully as their duties require not only competency and loyalty
but also trustworthiness.
4. LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES/ADVANTAGES
Unlike having forensic examiners at each campus, operating a centralized digital forensics lab will
provide benefits difficult to achieve without one.
4.1 Image Maintenance
Hopefully there are image [15] standards in place. Due to the challenge of distribution and installation
from a centralized facility most colleges provide imaging standards on each campus. Ideally, there are
standards set centrally which describe image content, frequency of refresh, etcetera.
Forensic examinations can readily identify where those standards are not being maintained and thus
corrective action can be initiated.
4.2 Consistent Practices
One of the challenges of managing multiple locations is that of consistency. In addition, it is not that
uncommon to come across practices at one location which are an improvement over that which is
practiced at other sites. Whether the result is that of bringing all sites into alignment or learning what
is better than a current practice, it is nothing but distinct value.
Another concern is that of inconsistency; for example, a situation develops that results in
management/clients/media noting a problem that could have been avoided had it followed a practice at
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site D, and why aren’t sites B, C and E also following site D’s model?
4.3 Building Trust/Confidence with the Campuses IT [16] Security Staff
While it is not uncommon for the IT Security teams at each campus to be initially wary when a
centralized digital forensic facility is created, when done carefully it will result in a trust relationship
which otherwise might not have been built. Over time it is more than likely that a query will be
received from an IT Security staff member or manager regarding a specific incident. When clear
concise explanations are offered while avoiding the implication of blame, trust develops; especially
when it is possible to point out how such situations can be avoided in the future.
5. SUMMARY
Selling the concept of a centralized digital forensics facility/lab in the collegiate environment can be
challenging. The basic premise of campus independence/autonomy will always be an issue.
However, the fact of the matter is that there is much to be gained and learned through centralizing
digital forensics as well as a potential significant cost savings.
No two colleges or campuses are identical. For campuses, location in terms of distance from the
college is a large consideration/influence. None-the-less, a serious examination of the potential
benefits of a centralized digital forensics lab should be performed.
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APPENDIX – SAMPLE FORENSICS EXAMINATION OPERATION
AUTHOR
Robert E. Johnston, CISSP, November 1, 2010, eMail: bjohnston@e-computer-security.com
OVERVIEW
This paper was prepared for a professional discussion group that wanted a basic explanation of a
forensics lab. Since the group consisted of virtually all private sector business security professionals
you will find that it avoids reference to the collegiate environment and I tried my best to make it
usable in the private sector. Common abbreviations are not explained and abbreviations created for
convenience in the paper are “explained” the first time they occur. In addition, you will find for your
convenience a complete list of abbreviations at the end of this document.
INTRODUCTION
Forensics Labs can take many forms. The reason for preparing this model is that it was requested by
someone who wanted “model procedures” to which I responded that there is not truly a model that is
uniform to all situations. I believe that the following dissertation will make that abundantly clear yet
possibly assist him in his assignment/endeavor.
This is based on an existing “successful” lab supporting an enterprise consisting of 12 remote
locations and a central office, all within a single state. Some of the practices contained herein clearly
will not work due to physical distances elsewhere. Understand that the distance from the central office
to any remote site does not exceed 60 miles with the majority within 30 miles. On the other hand,
why does the lab exist?
After all, there are commercial labs committed to the recovery of information; criminal labs intended
to identify illegal activity as well as many others including the enterprise which focuses upon network
compromise including PII, PCI and HIPAA issues. The lab to be illustrated is concerned with network
compromise, PII and to a limited extent PCI matters. At the same time such labs cannot ignore the
possibility of the discovery of illegal activity whether fraud, extortion, child pornography or other
criminal activity. While an enterprise might consider such possibility to be infinitesimally small, the
possibility should not be ignored!
Once one starts examining a hard drive, it is amazing what might be discovered. It truly ranges from
criminal activity to massive waste of resources and time as well as proper usage of enterprise
resources. While, for the most part the discovery of such activity not in the best interest of the
enterprise must be concluded on an individual basis, that option does not exist for some activity that
must be reported to law enforcement as the result of legislation. Thus, it is incumbent upon every
forensic activity to ensure that the “chain of custody” is maintained lest damage to the image of the
enterprise and/or violation of law occur when such activity is revealed but cannot be prosecuted and
possibly the offender cannot be reprimanded under corporate guidelines.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
When an event occurs at a Remote Office (RO) a notice is sent to the Central Office (CO) advising of
the issue and requesting advice as to the necessity of a forensic examination. A prompt reply is
provided confirming the need or offering technical advice when one is not needed.
Systems to be forensically examined have their drive(s) removed by authorized IT personnel at the RO
and a record kept of that individual as well as the reason for submission and details regarding the
drive’s identity on the RO Control Sheet (CS). The drive(s) is/are transported to the CO by one of
several authorized individuals and their identity is recorded along with the date and time on their CS.
The CO CS will record all drive handling from imaging through to return. The forensic examiners
(FEs) never touch the original drive, imaged drive or the archived version.
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THE FORENSIC LAB
Forensic labs are designed in many forms while, hopefully, meeting the objectives of management and
excellent business practices. All sorts of issues must be taken into consideration including available
resources (space, staff, objectives and etcetera). Many labs are the actual work space of the
examiners. Others adopt a more flexible environment by placing the lab in the data center
environment where the operations staff supports the forensic computers and the examiners connect to
them remotely, never having physical contact with the hardware.
Having operations perform all of the drive handling issues ensures knowing where the responsibility
lies as well as having the FEs totally focused upon their responsibilities of case examination and
reporting.
There clearly are advantages to both, but when all is said and done, procedurally many find the latter
arrangement to be the most advantageous. Once the drive is imaged and archived the image drive is
mounted on a forensic computer and the responsible FE notified; all of which is documented on the
CO CS.
THE EXAMINATION
FE activity commences with the creation of a virtual drive for a malware scan for all cases. However,
before the malware scan may be started specific “history files” must be created so that the result of the
malware scan and further activity can be properly documented. Using a naming standard created for
the forensic examinations all of the preliminary work of creating the temporary storage directory
(TSD) and propagating much of the content including copies of all quarantined items, an extract of
each of the major components of the registry and a boiler plate copy of the FE’s report (FER) to be
populated as the FE continues through to completion is created by a custom program created for this
activity. The FE then initiates the rescan directing the result be stored in a sub-directory of the TSD.
Then, a copy of the RO notice is created in the TSD and a summary of its content entered into the
FER. Dependent upon the reason for examination the FE proceeds to review the many resources
captured in the TSD while the malware scan continues to completion. Once completed any malware
infestations detected will be documented in the FER. When necessary, commonly for every
examination, the drive will be opened with a forensic examination tool and the details of the content of
the drive will be examined for the specifics needed to document and close the case.
When completed the FE will submit the FER to management for final disposition. From the FE’s
perspective the case is closed and all documentation is noted as closed including entries in the CS of
the RO and CO. Drive final disposition is also documented in the CS and the content of the TSD is
transferred to the permanent history file.
Other summary reports are created on a monthly basis from the FERs for use by management in
understanding just what is being examined and understanding the issues which might warrant further
action to preclude repetition.
ABBREVIATIONS
CO – Central Office
CS – Control Sheet
FE – forensic examiners
FER – forensic examiner’s report
RO – Remote Office
TSD – temporary storage directory
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